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Abstract Directive 95/46/EC and implementing legislation define the respective
obligations and liabilities of the different actors that may be involved in a personal data
processing operation. There are certain exceptions to the scope of these regulations,
among which processing which is carried out by natural persons in the course of
activities that may be considered ‘purely personal’. The purpose of this article is to
investigate the liability of users of social network sites under data protection and to
assess the extent to which the current data protection framework can sufficiently
accommodate the new realities of web 2.0 and social networking applications.
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Introduction
Online social networks are playing an increasingly important role in people’s social,
professional and cultural lives. The rapid growth in recent years, of the amount of
IDIS (2009) 2:65–79
DOI 10.1007/s12394-009-0017-3
B. Van Alsenoy (*) : J. Ballet :A. Kuczerawy : J. Dumortier










both social network sites (SNS) (Facebook, LinkedIn, Netlog, MySpace, ...) and
their users, shows how important these new fora for social interaction have become.
SNS provide participants with a means to transmit and share data with the people
they know (and don’t know) in ways that surpass traditional methods of
communication. Due to their continuously growing technical capabilities and
infrastructural setting (as internet applications), SNS offer individuals the opportu-
nity to share information and develop vast social networks with greater ease and
speed than previously possible. Another characteristic of most SNS is that they
enable users to expand their circle of ‘friends’ to individuals they have never met in
real life, and to interact with them in a wide variety of ways (instant messaging,
picture sharing, games, group membership, …).
However, the new online social networks not only provide new opportunities,
they also entail additional privacy risks. One could argue that these risks aren’t as
new as the opportunities themselves, but that the massive scale on which SNS
deploy their services simply multiplies the chances of the risks being effectively
manifested. A breach of confidence among friends is not uncommon in social
relations outside SNS. However, the risk and potential damage of such a breach is
significantly higher when, for example in the context of SNS, the threshold for
‘friendship’ may be lower and a large number of individuals are given access to
personal data without discrimination.
The privacy risks that linger on the dark side of SNS, feed themselves by the
(personal) data that are being processed through the services SNS provide. Certain
studies indicate that users of SNS are aware of privacy risks, but are not always very
concerned with the potential consequences (Goldie 2006: 150–153). The few
mechanisms which are employed by the users of SNS to protect their privacy are
generally limited to restriction of content (e.g. political opinions), relying on the
anonymity (or pseudonymity) in SNS where available, or limiting the personal
identifiable information they reveal (Goldie 2006: 154–157). Every individual is of
course free to determine which aspects of his personal life he or she wishes to
disclose. But what happens when SNS users include information relating to others in
their social networking activities? The purpose of this paper is to analyze which
actors (and to what extent) are responsible for compliance with data protection
principles, under the framework set forth by Directive 95/46/EC (hereafter: “the
Directive” or “DPD”). In particular, we seek to investigate the possible responsi-
bilities and corresponding liabilities of users of SNS under the existing framework.
The Directive and implementing legislation define the respective obligations
and liabilities of the different actors that may be involved in a personal data
processing operation. Directive 95/46 also provides for certain exceptions to its
scope, among which processing which is carried out by natural persons in the
course of activities that may be considered ‘purely personal’. Given the fact that
most SNS are designed to house virtual circles of friends and personal profiles
of its users (and are therefore primarily intended for recreational use), we must
also examine the extent to which processing operations or entities may be
exempted from complying with data protection regulations. The purpose of
this analysis is to assess the extent to which the current framework can
sufficiently accommodate the new realities of web 2.0 and social networking
applications.
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Misuse of SNS
SNS come in all sizes and shapes. However, their common ‘raison d’être’ can be
found in the interaction between virtual identities of real life people. Most SNS
require a profile from the user and foresee the possibility of establishing a network
of relations. The interactions among virtual identities on SNS imply a continuous
exchange of data, whether it be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.
As indicated earlier, most SNS thrive on the willingness of users to exchange
personal data and thus on their willingness to give up a part of their own privacy. Of
course, social interaction, especially when dealing with members of your personal
inner circle (e.g. family members, friends), ordinarily requires some release of
personal information. The nature of the data being exchanged varies largely
depending on the target-audience of SNS. LinkedIn for instance, is focused on
education and employment, while other sites are intended to share sensitive data like
health data.1
Privacy implications and risks typically associated with the potential misuse of
personal data exchanged on SNS range from exposure to direct marketing, re-
identification, profiling, identity theft, online and physical stalking, blackmailing and
embarrassment. (See Gross and Acquisti 2005: 78–79)
Contemporary developments in case law have confirmed that privacy may also be
jeopardized by ‘ordinary’ SNS users. A case recently decided by the High Court of
England involved defamatory statements that were made by using a Facebook pro-
file. (Applause Store 2008) The defendant had created a profile using the name of
the plaintiff (MF) and created the group ‘Has MF lied to you?’, which was linked to
the profile by hyperlink. The false profile contained defamatory content relating to
the plaintiff and his company; and also revealed information as to the defendant’s
sexual orientation, his relationship status, his birthday, and his political and religious
views. (Applause Store 2008: 3–4) The High Court found that these activities gave
rise to a cause of action both for defamation and misuse of private information. No
claims appeared to have been brought under the UK Data Protection Act however.
Countless scenarios can be imagined in which processing activities performed by
a social network user would arguably constitute a violation of data protection
principles. What if for instance a person was to create a public profile at a health-
related SNS, in someone else’s name, proclaiming that he suffered from a sexually
transmitted disease? Or merely made a statement to that extent about another person
on his own profile page? Or posted ‘compromising’ pictures involving other people
than just himself?
In many instances, such conduct will be actionable on the basis of other grounds
than the provisions of a Member States’ data protection act (e.g. defamation, right of
personal portrayal). However, not all claims give rise to the same extent of damages
and may be subject to different exceptions. For instance, in many Member States,
one of the lines of defense against defamation charges lies in proving the veracity of
the stated facts. When there is no pre-existing relationship of confidence between the
plaintiff and the defendant, a claim for misuse of private information under UK law
1 See e.g. www.patientslikeme.com.
Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection regulations? 67
requires that the defendant acquired the information by ‘unlawful or surreptitious
means’. (See Brimsted 2008: 466)
It is in light of such possible restrictions that we seek to analyze to what extent the
processing activities performed by SNS participants are subject to data protection
regulations. Unfortunately, as we will see over the following sections, this issue is
not entirely free of legal uncertainty.
Role definition
Actors
Under the framework of Directive 95/46/EC, there are at least two actors implicated
for every processing of personal data: a controller and a data subject. A data subject
is any individual to whom the information relates, provided that he or she is
identified or sufficiently identifiable (art. 2, a). The controller is the entity who alone,
or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing. It is
also possible that the controller chooses not to perform all the desired processing
operations entirely by himself, but to have a whole or a part of the processing
operations carried out by a different entity. A ‘processor’ is then an entity who
carries out such operations on behalf of the data controller (art. 2, e).
Directive 95/46/EC assigns practically all responsibility for compliance with data
protection regulations to the controller. In the event the controller chooses to rely
upon a processor for a whole or a part of the processing, he must bind the latter to
only act in accordance with his instructions by way of a contract (see art. 17, par. 3).
He remains liable however towards third parties.2
Given the fundamental importance of the qualification as either a controller or a
processor, it is crucial to be able to determine in which capacity an entity is
performing a particular processing operation. Despite this reality, technological
developments since the enactment of the Directive have made it increasingly
difficult to apply the distinction between ‘data controller’ and ‘data processor’ in
practice. (Kuner 2007: 71–72) In order to illustrate this properly, we must depart
briefly from the context of social networks.
Problems of qualification
At the time the Directive was adopted, the distinction was far clearer between parties
who control the processing of personal data (data controllers) and those who only
process the data on behalf of another entity (processors). (Kuner 2007: 71) Current
business models for data processing are structured quite differently, and more and
more parties divide their respective responsibilities in a way which does not allow
for a clear distinction between data controller and processor. (Kuner 2007: 72)
2 In the event that the processor violates his obligations towards the controller by exceeding his
instructions, the controller will generally be able to take recourse upon the processor for the damages he
incurred. However, the controller will in first instance have to defend the claims brought against him.
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This is particularly the case when several autonomous (or relatively autonomous)
entities collaborate to realize a certain application. The distinction especially
becomes more clouded the more each participant has a stake in or receives some
benefit from the processing. Much may be clarified by investigating the respective
business models and practices of each entity involved, but it often remains debatable
from what point an entity has sufficient input in determining the ‘purposes and means’
to be considered a controller. An additional factor which sometimes renders the
distinctive roles less clear lies in the fact that the different collaborating entities may
have been processing certain data for their own purposes prior to the collaboration.3
These developments have led us to adopt a less ‘monolithic’ conception of
controllership with regards to personal data processing in which clearly distinct
actors are participating. In the end, it becomes necessary to distinguish between the
different types of processing operations and to determine which role each entity
plays with regards to a particular processing operation. It is important to distinguish
between the decision-making power concerning the overall structure of an
application, its security features, its generic purpose etc. on the one hand, and the
other hand the decision-making power that is exercised when deciding whether or
not to make use of a particular application, which leads to the input of specific
personal data. If both sets of decisions are made by the same entity, there is likely to
be a single controller for that application. Otherwise there will most often be
multiple controllers at work, though they are not necessarily to be qualified as ‘co-
controllers’ or be jointly liable for the same processing operations. In other words,
each participating entity might be considered a controller, but not necessarily for the
same processing operations.
The approach we have outlined brings about two important consequences. First, it
implies that for the same data exchange, which involves several separate actions,
there can be more than one data controller, for the different actions that occur.
Secondly, it hints that for a data exchange, the entity initiating the exchange may be
considered to be acting as a controller with regards to its content. When an entity
chooses to collaborate with others, and to share data it already had under its control
for a different purpose, it bears the responsibility to assess the compatibility of the
intended processing with the purpose for which the data was originally collected.4
And if found not to be compatible, it shall in first instance be the provider of the data
who will need to take the necessary measures to ensure that the intended processing
shall comply with data protection (which may entail: obtaining a new informed
consent, filing a new or expanding an existent notification, …).
The user of SNS as data controller
In order to be qualified as a controller, an entity must exercise at least some level of
decision-making power with regards to both the purposes and means of a particular
processing operation.
3 This is increasingly common in the corporate world; where several relatively autonomous entities
collaborate for instance to create a shared employee database. Other examples include the exchange of
electronic health records among different hospitals, and the creation of interoperable eGovernment
services involving different administrative entities.
4 See art. 6, 1 b) DPD.
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The purposes for which a user processes personal data within an SNS typically
varies according to the type of SNS and the audience it seeks to address. In the
majority of cases, users process data for purposes of social interaction or self-
expression. Other purposes may include career development, self-education, …
Every user can in fact freely determine the purposes of his processing within a given
SNS.
As to determining the technical means of the processing, the user of an SNS
generally does not have a great deal of decision-making power. While he may have
the ability to adapt some minor features or settings according to his own wishes, he
does not have any real power of negotiation as to the manner in which the
processing is conducted. He either ‘takes it or leaves it’. But every user does, as a
rule, exercise the choice as to whether or not he wishes to provide a particular piece
of information and of which application he makes use to do so. In this sense he still
effectively determines the means of the processing when he entrusts data to an SNS.
This leads to the finding that users of SNS or web 2.0 applications may, at least in
theory, be acting as data controllers. One must however be careful not to exaggerate
the decision-making power of the individual user. The controllership of the user does
not extend to the SNS as a whole, but only to those processing operations for which
he can actually determine the purposes and means. The user of an SNS therefore
only acts as a controller with regards to the content he chooses to provide and the
processing operations he initiates.
It is important to note that the choices of the user are of course premised on his
understanding of the functioning of the SNS. The role of the terms of use of the
service will be discussed infra; under “Terms of use”. In “Personal use” we will
investigate to what extent the activities of an SNS user may be exempted from
compliance with the Directive under the exception for personal use.
Liability of the SNS
The SNS service provider, from its part, determines its own purposes for processing.
In most cases it offers its service to individuals primarily for the purpose of monetary
gain. In addition to the operations that are strictly necessary to provide the service,
this often implies additional processing activities; such as those serving to facilitate
or enable direct marketing.
The SNS service provider determines practically entirely the means to achieve its
purposes: it configures and operates the service expected by users, chooses how to
make information available to third parties for marketing purposes, determines how
much advertising space it shall foresee, etc.
Briefly put, the service provider determines both the purposes and means for the
SNS as a whole. With regards to the actual content that is being distributed over the
SNS, the service provider often exercises relatively little control at the moment this
information is being uploaded by a particular user.5 Nevertheless, it also acts as a
controller when providing the service and distributing this information. Once the
5 The SNS may of course induce the provision of certain types of information; e.g. by marking certain
fields as ‘required’. But even where the terms of use stipulate that the provided information should be
accurate, there is no real guarantee that this shall in fact be the case.
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personal data has been made available to it, the SNS provider proceeds to perform
operations upon personal data of which it has determined the ‘purposes and the
means’ in advance. Therefore the SNS provider may be labeled co-controller
(together with the relevant users) with regards to the content being distributed over
the SNS.
Some might say that this line of reasoning imposes too heavy a burden upon the
SNS provider, arguing that in order to be able to provide an open service, the SNS
provider cannot preventively ‘screen’ each request to create a profile or constantly
monitor its application for any possible data protection violations instantiated by
users.
This issue of liability of SNS providers is adjacent to the current controversy
regarding the liability of web 2.0 service providers under the e-Commerce Directive
(Directive 2000/31/EC). A full investigation into this matter falls outside the scope
of this publication, which focuses more on the potential obligations of users of SNS
and web 2.0 applications under data protection regulations. Suffice it to say for the
moment that the e-Commerce Directive exempts certain service providers of liability
for the content they may be hosting or transmitting provided certain conditions are
met; but that it is still heavily disputed the extent to which web 2.0 service providers
may benefit from these exemptions. (See Montero 2008)
Recital 47 of the data protection directive provides a basis to suggest a limitation
of liability for the providers of electronic communication services for the content
they transmit; but its language is clearly too specific to support an analogy for the
providers of SNS.6
Exemptions of liability may however also be found in national legislation
implementing the Directive. The Belgian Data Protection Act for instance provides
that the controller of the processing shall be exempted of liability ‘if he can prove
that the injurious fact can not be attributed to him’.7 The standard to assess whether
or not an action or situation is attributable to the controller is one of reasonableness.
The SNS provider can thus escape liability under the Belgian Data Protection Act if
he demonstrates having continuously undertaken all reasonable measures to prevent
the data protection violation from taking place, and to limit their effects once they
have been manifested.
Terms of use
The contractual relationship between a user and the SNS he has joined is determined
largely by the terms of use (privacy policy included) to which the user must consent
prior to receiving the service. These terms are as a rule drawn unilaterally up by the
6 Recital (47) of the DPD provides: “Whereas where a message containing personal data is transmitted by
means of a telecommunications or electronic mail service, the sole purpose of which is the transmission of
such messages, the controller in respect of the personal data contained in the message will normally be
considered to be the person from whom the message originates, rather than the person offering the
transmission services; whereas, nevertheless, those offering such services will normally be considered
controllers in respect of the processing of the additional personal data necessary for the operation of the
service”.
7 Art. 15bis of the Law of 8 December 1992 concerning the protection of privacy in relation to the
processing of personal data, Belgian State Gazette, 18 March 1993.
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SNS provider and in most cases stipulate that they may be modified by the SNS
provider at will.8
However, the contractual relation between user and SNS is subordinate to
mandatory regulations, such as the Directive and the national data protection acts.
Consequently the SNS (and user) are not entirely free to determine the attribution
of roles and liabilities as controller or processor. The terms of use may modify the
liability scheme for purposes of their (internal) relationship towards one and other,
but this does not affect the rights of third parties. Every entity acting as a controller
remains subject to suit by injured parties for violation of the data protection
regulations, notwithstanding possible recourse by that entity in accordance with their
contractual relationship (or exemptions of liability established by law).
The terms of use play an important role in defining the extent to which the user
and SNS act as co-controllers. After all, the user’s ‘choice of means’ is premised on
his understanding of the functioning of the SNS. He can only subscribe to those
means of which he is aware or has been notified. Only insofar as the SNS processes
the data in accordance with the terms of use, can it be sustained that user and SNS
act as co-controllers. Once the SNS proceeds to process data beyond the scope of
what has been agreed in the terms of use–without obtaining the (explicit or implicit)
consent of the user–the SNS will be qualified as the sole controller of the processing
and bear the corresponding liabilities alone.
Personal use
We concluded in the previous section that the user of a social network may in
principle be acting as a controller with regards to the processing operations he
himself initiates. The question still remains however as to whether his actions fall
within the scope of the Directive. The second indent of art. 3.2 provides that the
Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data ‘by a natural person in
the course of a purely personal or household activity’. To what extent do users
participating in social networks benefit from this exemption?
Recital (12) provides some, albeit limited, further guidance as to the scope of this
provision. It suggests excluding personal data processing that is carried out by a
natural person ‘in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or
domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of records of addresses’.
The terms ‘purely’ and ‘exclusively’ indicate that the exception for personal use
should be construed narrowly, but both phrasings still leave room for much
speculation seeing as they do not provide a clear standard as to what may or may not
constitute a ‘personal activity’.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has in one instance addressed this issue,
namely when it was requested to issue a preliminary ruling in the course of the
Lindqvist case. (Lindqvist 2003) Mrs. Lindqvist, who worked as a catechist in a local
parish, had set up a number of web pages to provide information to fellow
parishioners preparing for their confirmation. These pages also included information
8 The consent of the user to the changes in the terms of use is usually inferred from the fact that he
continues to use the SNS after the (notification of) the modifications. (See Terms of Use 2008).
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about several of her colleagues in the parish, who were referenced either by their full
names or merely by their first names. In many cases telephone numbers were listed.
The pages also described, ‘in a mildly humorous manner’ the jobs held by these
colleagues and their hobbies. Other information was also mentioned, such as family
circumstances; and of one colleague it was stated that she had injured her foot and
was working half-time for medical reasons.
Mrs. Lindqvist had not obtained the consent of the individuals referenced on her
web pages, nor informed them of the fact that she was mentioning personal
information about them. She also hadn’t notified the data protection authority. She
was subsequently prosecuted for violation of the Swedish law on personal data.
As to the question of whether the activities of Mrs. Lindqvist were covered by the
exception for personal use, the ECJ replied that the exception must ‘be interpreted as
relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life
of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data
consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an
indefinite number of people’. (Lindqvist 2003: 47)
The Court appears to have put forward two elements to determine whether the
exception of personal use is applicable. In the first place the processing activity must
be carried out ‘in the course of private and family life’. Secondly, the exception shall
not apply where the data is published on the internet and made accessible to an
indefinite number of people.
This clarification provided by the ECJ is most valuable to our further analysis; yet
does not fully settle the matter. It precludes those instances in which the data is made
available to an ‘indefinite’ number of people, yet does not specify a limit or
threshold. The question also remains as to how one determines whether an activity is
being carried in the course of private or family life. (See also Wong and Savirimuthu
2008: 256)
As to the latter question, several approaches can be imagined. A first possible
approach could be to look at the content of the data. There one would seek to verify
whether the information being processed could reasonably be related to the ‘private
sphere’. Such an approach must immediately be discarded however: the applicability
of the Directive is not decided by the nature or content of the information being
processed. (Article 29 Working Party 2007: 6) Furthermore, such an interpretation
would lead to a situation where potentially highly sensitive information could fall
outside the scope of the directive, whereas its ambit covers even information which
may at first sight appear not to be privacy-sensitive or ‘harmless’. (Article 29
Working Party 2007: 6)
A second approach could consist in evaluating the quality or capacity of the
recipients. Relevant questions under this approach would include: does it concern a
close friend or family member? Is there a sufficiently ‘personal’ connection among
the entities involved? This approach taken by itself has the disadvantage of not
taking into account that individuals might have both a professional and a personal
relationship with each other. It might also lead to undue scrutinization of the level of
intimacy between the entities involved.
A third, more comprehensive approach, answers the question of personal use by
looking at the context of the processing activity. This approach can be aligned both
with the language of the Directive and with the interpretation proffered by the ECJ.
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The exception in fact concerns processing activities carried out ‘in the course of’ a
personal or private activity.
It is noteworthy in this regard that whereas art. 3.2 of the Directive exempts data
processing in the context of ‘purely personal or household’ activities, the ECJ makes
reference to activities which are carried out in the course of ‘private or family life’.
The latter phrasing is nowhere to be found in the text of the Directive. It is arguable
that this choice of words was instead inspired by the language of art. 7 of the EU
Charter and/or art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.9 If the allusion
to the terminology of these instruments was intentional, it could have significant
ramifications for the scope of the exception for personal use.
It has long been established that the protection of ‘private life’ under art. 8 ECHR
is not restricted to that which has historically been dubbed ‘the private sphere’.
Instead, the European Court of Human Rights has underlined that it also protects a
right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and develop
relationships with others. (See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, P.G. and
European Court of Human Rights, J.H. v. United Kingdom 2001: 56, European
Court of Human Rights, Niemietz v. Germany 1992: 29) (See also Bygrave 1998)
Bona fide users of social networks in first instance participate for purposes of social
interaction. In addition, SNS also serve as a means for users to express themselves
and develop their own (digital) identity. (See Goldie 2006: 139–142 and 160–162)
Under this line of reasoning, it could be argued that bona fide participation in social
networks should, at least in theory, be able to benefit from the exception for personal
use. However, one may not lose track of the second element in the reasoning of the
ECJ, namely that the exception shall not apply where the data is made accessible to
an indefinite number of people.
The Belgian Privacy Commission, in a recommendation regarding the sharing of
pictures by individuals (Belgian Privacy Commission, Recommendation 02/2007
2007), also touched upon the question of personal use. It considered that where
images are processed for the sole purpose of distribution among a select (‘definable’)
group of friends, family members or acquaintances, such processing could fall under
the exception of personal use. As examples it mentioned the transmission of pictures
via email to the participants of a family event, or the posting of such pictures on a
secured website, which is only accessible to the relevant family members; and which
is protected against indexing by search engines. (Belgian Privacy Commission 2007:
21–22) The Dutch Data Protection Authority adopted an almost identical approach
shortly thereafter in its Guidance Report relating to the publication of personal data
on the internet. (See College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens 2007: 12–13).
Users of SNS are often afforded the ability to choose whether their profile should
be ‘public’ or ‘private’. Private profiles are generally only fully accessible to other
users marked as ‘friends’. As regards to search engines, Facebook for instance
appears to have opened up its application to indexing, but at the same time has given
its users the opportunity to hide their profile from search results. But should these
privacy settings of a user’s account be a determinative criterion in assessing
9 Art. 8 ECHR reads: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.’ (Council of Europe 1950) Art. 7 of the EU Charter reads: ‘Everyone has the right to
respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’ (EU Charter 2000).
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applicability of data protection legislation? The exception of personal use has been
held not to apply when the data is made accessible to an indefinite number of people.
Given the relatively low threshold many users set for deciding whether to accept
someone as a friend (See Gross and Acquisti 2005: 73 and Boyd 2004: 1280.
Contra: Goettke and Christiana 2007), should such weight in fact be accorded to
users’ settings? We would argue that the mere ‘public’ or ‘private’ setting of a profile
by itself is too arbitrary a criterion, especially when considering the potentially great
number of recipients even when the user has set his profile to private. In each
instance it would still need to be verified whether the actions of the user can be
considered as having been carried out in the course of a purely ‘personal’ or ‘private’
activity.
Implications
In the current state of the legal framework many SNS users shall be unable to avail
themselves of the exception of personal use. Merely displaying a ‘list of friends’
strictly speaking amounts to personal data processing when the individuals listed are
reasonably identifiable. SNS users will therefore almost certainly fall within the
scope of the DPD when their profile is set to ‘public’. It is still debatable whether
users with ‘private’ profiles may benefit from the exception for personal use. In
those instances the result is most likely to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Needless to say, this outcome affects both malicious as well as ‘bona fide’ users
of SNS. Every data controller is under the obligation to ensure that his processing
activities comply with data protection regulations. This entails, inter alia, that they
must ensure10:
– the legitimacy of the processing11;
– respect for the data quality principles such as fairness, proportionality, finality
and accuracy12;
– that the data subject has the ability to exercise his rights towards the processing
(right of access, rectification, erasure or blocking)13;
– the confidentiality and security of processing14;
– where required, that notification to national supervisory authorities is performed.
As a general matter, SNS profiles containing personal data relating to others
should fall within the scope of the Directive; especially when these profiles are
accessible to the public at large. It implies that profile owners must obtain the
unambiguous consent of the individuals involved prior to posting any information
related to them. It also brings about the obligation to remove any information the
data subject perceives as harmful or undesirable when he or she exercises the right to
object to the processing.
10 The list provided here is not exhaustive. For a more extensive overview of the obligations of data
controllers see (Kuner 2007).
11 Art. 7 et seq. DPD.
12 Art. 6 DPD.
13 Art. 12 DPD.
14 Art. 16–17 DPD.
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On the other hand, we must also note that there are several provisions in the
Directive and national implementations which may require some reconsideration or
additional clarification. For instance, how does one interpret the requirement of not
keeping personal data ‘in a form which permits identification’ for longer than is
necessary (art. 6, 1, e) in the context of online social networks? Is it possible to
determine a reasonable time-span as to how long a user should be allowed to
maintain a picture or remark relating to another person on his profile page? Or may
the data simply persist up until the moment that the data subject exercises the right to
object?
Every controller is also obliged to inform the data subject of at least his identity
and the purposes of the processing.15 Strictly speaking, this implies that every user
falling under the scope of the Directive is required to inform all data subjects
referenced in his profile of his ‘real-world’ identity. Such a requirement may impose
a significant limitation on the pseudonymous use of SNS, whereas several Data
Protection Commissioners have only recently advocated that SNS providers should
enable and encourage the creation and use of pseudonymous profiles. (Resolution on
Privacy Protection in Social Network Services 2008) Of course data subjects may
also be informed of the identity of the controller through alternative channels. But it
is highly questionable whether such notification will take place in practice when no
pre-existing relationship exists among them. One could argue that an SNS user must
be willing to give up his pseudonymity if he or she decides to process personal data
relating to others. But what if the only personal data relating to others in the profile
is the user’s friend list? Does every (reasonably identifiable) individual accepted as a
friend then later have a claim to learn the real-world identity of the profile owner,
regardless of whether or not he or she suffered any harm?
Closely related to the previous issue is the question of how other data subject
rights are to be accommodated by the SNS provider and SNS users respectively. For
instance, it may be assumed that if a data subject exercises his right to object towards
the profile owner, the latter is under an obligation to remove this information from
his profile immediately. However, what happens when the privacy policy of the SNS
allows the provider to retain the data for a longer period of time? In the event of a
dispute, may the data subject hold both the SNS user and SNS provider liable when
only the latter proceeds to keep the data under his control? The SNS user may not be
‘in control’ of this further processing, but he or she was nevertheless responsible for
the initial release of the data (cf. supra). The Directive currently does not explicitly
require co-controllers to specify in a contract how data subject rights shall be
accommodated. SNS users will have only limited or no negotiating power to see
adequate provisions included in the terms of use.
The obligation to ensure the ‘confidentiality of security of processing’ also takes
on a new dimension in the context of SNS. This requirement entails that the
controller must ensure inter alia that the personal data which is being processed is
only disclosed on a ‘need-to-know’ basis. When the user’s profile is set to public,
there is no restriction with regards to the entities that may access the information.
But even where the profile is set to private, most SNS do not yet provide users with
15 Art. 10–11 DPD.
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great deal of freedom in determining which elements of their profile shall be visible
to which ‘friends’.
Liability towards data subjects for violation of data protection principles is not the
only consequence of the qualification as data controller. It also brings about several
formal requirements such as the obligation to file a notification with the supervisory
authority mentioned in art. 18 of the Directive. Certain Member States have
introduced exceptions to the notification obligation in their national legislation
which may benefit social network users. In France for instance, the Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL) decided to dispense certain web sites
created by individuals from the notification obligation, for both the collection and
distribution personal data. This exemption only applies insofar as this processing
takes place in the course of ‘a strictly personal activity’. (Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés 2005) At the same time the CNIL emphasized that this
does not dispense these individuals from complying with any of the other provisions
governing the processing of personal data. They remain obligated to obtain the
individual’s prior informed consent, and must remove the data immediately if the
data subject chooses to exercise his right to object. (Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés 2005)
The Dutch Data Protection Authority has announced that their Ministry of Justice
is considering an exemption to the notification obligation for ‘personal publications’.
Two additional conditions are expected to apply: the processing shall only be
exempted if (1) all personal data is removed as soon as the data subject objects to the
processing of his personal data and (2) the web pages containing personal data are
protected against indexing by search engines. (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens
2007: 29)
In other Member States, e.g., in Belgium, there has not yet been any indication of
the intent to provide exemptions to the notification obligation for personal websites,
blogs or social network activities.
Conclusion and outlook
At the time the Directive was being prepared, the European Parliament and Council
could not foresee the fast development of social network sites, their popularity and
impact on the privacy of users and non-users around the world. At that time, when
individuals initiated personal data processing outside of a purely personal or
domestic setting, in most cases they did so under the authority of an employer who
was responsible for ensuring compliance with data protection regulations. Now, with
the emergence of web 2.0 applications, every individual has the ability to distribute
personal information to a large audience with great ease, and without needing a high
level of technical proficiency. Seeing as this creates a setting in which the interests of
third parties may easily be damaged, it is necessary that a clear legal framework is in
place which governs the activities of SNS users.
In the previous section we have very briefly listed a few of the implications (and
complications) of applying data protection legislation in the context of SNS. Many
of the core provisions of the data protection directive could substantially benefit
third parties who feel they have been wronged by information posted on an SNS
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profile. But for several provisions it also appears difficult or unrealistic to apply
them to SNS users with great rigidity. Seeing as the advent of web 2.0 brought along
new opportunities for individuals, which could not be anticipated when the Directive
was enacted, it is desirable that these issues be further clarified. We hope that the
Article 29 Working Party includes them in their analysis when they adopt their
opinion on on-line social networks. (Article 29 Working Party 2008–2009)
In this regard notice should also be taken of the report of the International
Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications regarding privacy in
social networks, which stated in its ‘guidance towards regulators’ that regulators
should rethink the ‘current regulatory framework with respect to controllership of
(specifically third party-) personal data published on social networking sites, with a
view to possibly attributing more responsibility for personal data content on social
networking sites to social network service providers’. (International Working Group
on Data Protection in Telecommunications 2008) Whether or not more responsibility
needs to be attributed to SNS providers is also still open for debate.
In any event, it is our opinion that further clarification, guidance and perhaps
some revision of the existing framework is needed to accommodate the new realities
of web 2.0 and social networking applications.
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